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I.  Introductory notes and aim of the paper 
The paper aims at finding new empirical results about signalling theory of the capital structure of 
companies listed at the Athens Stock Exchange. 
The paper is divided in three parts. The first part includes a short description of the capital structure 
theories and an introduction to the signalling theory. The second part consists of the empirical findings of 
the investigation and their analysis. The third part includes the conclusions of the empirical investigation 
and some topics for further research. 
 
 
II.  Capital structure theories, signalling theory and the findings of previous empirical investigations 
2.1 Capital structure theories 
Capital structure shows the percentage of debt and equity in the balance sheet of a company and it is 
different from firm to firm. Other companies prefer to finance their activities with equity, while others 
with debt. The question is whether some capital structures are better than others. A capital structure is 
considered to be good, when it has as a consequence a fall in the cost of capitals. The weighted average 
cost of capital is the weighted sum of the costs of all sources of finance. The company’s value is equal to 
the present value of the expected, future free cash flows, using the Weighted Average Cost of Capital. 
When the Weighted Average Cost of Capital is minimized, keeping the free cash flows stable, the value if 
the firm is maximized. 
 
Debt has two main advantages. First, it contains less risk for the investors than equity. Second, interests 
have a tax advantage. But, on the other hand, debt has two disadvantages as well. First, it increases the 
variance of earnings. The greater variance of earnings, provokes the investors to ask for greater returns. 
So,  the increase of leverage may cause an increase in the cost of equity, decreasing the advantages of the 
low cost of debt. The second disadvantage is that it increases the cost of financial distress, which may be 
considerable, if the company uses debt often. 
Academics have been arguing about the significance of the capital structure for the last 40 years, and we 
still don’t have straight answers. Following the Modigliani and Miller proposals, researchers of the 
decades of 60s and 70s paid attention to the market’s imperfections, which can make the value of the firm 
to depend on its capital structure. The main imperfections are: taxation, which encourages the undertaking 
of debt, but not the dividends and the expected costs of financial distress, which increase with the 




At the end of the 70s, a new subject appeared. This new subject on capital structure was signaling. For 
example, there is a fall in the stock price, when the company announces an equity raise, and a rise in the 
stock price when the company announces a stock repurchase. These results seemed to confirm the 
existence of great costs of information, which could affect the choices of finance.   
Capital structure is an important decision for every company. It is important, not because of the need to 
maximize the investments’ returns, but due to its effect in the company’s capability to face the 
competition’s challenges. The best-known capital structure theory is Modigliani and Miller’s (1958, 
1963). In their first article they came to the conclusion that capital structure does not affect the company’s 
value. So, there would be no optimal capital structure, nor minimal weighted average cost of capital 
(W.A.C.C.). In their second article, they included taxation, and found that a company should use as much 
debt as it can, to take advantage of the tax reduction and maximize their value. 
The Modigliani – Miller theory was criticized, mostly for its hypotheses, and less for its content. Its most 
important flaw is the fact that presupposes the existence of perfect financial markets. In their second 
article, the writers import the notion of taxation, leaving all the other hypotheses the same. In this case, the 
optimal capital structure, is the one where the company was financed almost exclusively with debt, 
something that is not usual in reality, because the cost of debt increases, when leverage increases. The 
increase of a firm’s leverage seems to be a solution, but in fact it is a short – term solution, since a 
company cannot constantly increase its debt. 
 
J.M. Gordon (1989) suggests, the Modigliani and Miller theory is true, under a number of conditions. 
These conditions are referred to as perfect markets. In perfect markets there is no taxation, no transaction 
costs and information is available to everyone with costs. 
  
Trade – off theory suggests as an optimal capital structure, that mix of equity and debt where present value 
of tax advantages equals to the present value of costs related to debt. Its main advantage is the fact that it 
suggests mediocre leverage and that it is easy to understand. Its disadvantage is the fact that it is a general, 
descriptive theory that does not explain which exactly is the right level of leverage. According to Berens 
and Cuny (1995), another problem of the trade-off theory is the fact that it predicts debt ratios which are 
greater than the real ones. 
Myers and Majluf (1984), and Myers (1984) developed the pecking order hypothesis. According to this 
theory, companies prefer to be financed by internal funds, then by debt, and finally by raising new equity. 
Their results are strengthened by Krasker (1986). 
There are two main approaches explaining pecking order (Halov, Heider, 2005). The first refers to 
transaction costs of external financing, while the second one is based to asymmetric information theory. 
According to the approach of transaction costs, the type of funds that will be preferred depends on the 
costs of the issue. According the asymmetric information theory, debt is preferred to equity, because 
taking a loan is a positive sign for investors who are not as well informed as the management. If a 
company undertakes a loan, investors will assume that the management believes that the company’s 
common stock is undervalued. Pecking order hypothesis is better supported by empirical investigations, in 
comparison to trade – off theory. 
A disadvantage of pecking order hypothesis (Myers, 2001) is the fact that managers act in favor of the 
current shareholders, maximizing the value of existing stocks. But it does not refer motivation of the 
managers. 
Benito (2003) examined the capital structure decisions, and more specifically trade-off theory and pecking 
order hypothesis. He used data from two different economies, the Spanish and the English one. The results 
support pecking order hypothesis, as debt ratios are negatively related to cash flows and earnings, and 
positively with investments. This negative relation with the earnings of the company does not agree with 
trade off theory. But, in general, equity issues seem to be more common than the strict description that the 
pecking order would propose. 
Dittmar (2004) examined the way firms choose the initial capital structure of their subsidiaries. The 
positive feature of subsidiaries is that through them, we can analyze the capital structure of the whole 
corporation. When the subsidiary is no longer financed by the corporation, the corporation chooses the 
capital structure of the new firm. The new firm initially had neither external debt, nor the control over its 
capital structure. The sample used consisted of 155 corporations between 1983 and 1995. The results of 
this research seem to agree with trade off theory. More specifically, growth is related negatively, while the 
value of the mortgages is related positively with the choice of debt. 
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The free cash flow theory suggests that too high levels of debt will increase the value, despite the 
increased possibility of bankruptcy, when the cash flows of the firm are more than the chances of positive 
investments. The free cash flow theory was mainly developed for mature firms that often proceed to over-
investments.   
Managerial opportunism hypothesis states that capital structure is the cumulative result of the managers’ 
actions (Baker, Wurgler, 2001). Managers issue stocks when the company’s stock is overvalued, and 
repurchase them, when the stocks are undervalued. Managers’ aim is to be synchronized with the market, 
so as to take profits for the current investors. This theory has common points with pecking order 
hypothesis, as they both act for the current investors’ benefit, and with signaling theory, as they both 
believe that the company issues stocks when their price is overvalued. 
According to Graham and Harvey (2001), managers of the firms are affected by the stock price when they 
intend to raise equity. The approach of timing with the market suggests that capital structure is the result 
of former actions in order to synchronize with the market. According to this approach, there is no optimal 
capital structure. The theory of timing itself seems to be the explanation. 
According to Leland E. Hayne (1998), two main theories determined the development of capital structure 
theories, the Modigliani and Miller theory (1958, 1963) and Jensen and Meckling theory (1976). A great 
number of theoretical and empirical papers were based on these two theories. But prior research seemed to 
have two disadvantages. It was not complete and it did not give quantitative answers. Leland (1998) is 
trying to have element from both Modigliani and Miller theory and Jensen and Meckling theory about the 
optimal capital structure. 
Ronald W. Masulis (1983) examined the effect of a change in the levels of debt in the firm value. He used 
two types of change, issuer exchange offers and recapitalizations. The results showed that the stock prices 
and the values of the firms’ were positively related to these capital structure changes. 
Odean (1998) examined the psychology of investors and how it affects their actions. His research 
concludes that the volume of transactions increases when internal users seem to be very confident. 
Hovakimian Armen, Opler Tim and Titman Sheridan (2001) found that although pecking order hypothesis 
affects debt ratios in the short-term period of time, but companies tend to try to reach ratios – targets, 
which is in agreement with trade-off theory. The findings also agree with agency theory and asymmetric 
information, as managers are unwilling to issue stocks in low prices or to increase their leverage when the 
stock prices are too low. 
In general, we can conclude that Modigliani and Miller theory agrees with the trade off theory, while 
pecking order hypothesis is consistent with the asymmetric information theory and signaling theory. 
Despite the research, there is no thorough explanation for the optimal capital structure of firms (Haris, 
Raviv, 1991). 
Myers (2001), in his article for trade off, pecking order and free cash flow theory, states that none of these 
theories gives general explanations for financial strategies, as they were not designed to be general. These 
capital structure theories are valid under conditions. Each one emphasizes in certain costs and advantages 
of different financing strategies. Every researcher can find statistical results that agree with more than one 
theory, because each theory is valid for parts of the sample. 
 
2.2 Signaling theory 
 
At the end of the 70’s, Ross (1977), and other writers developed the capital structure signalling theory 
based upon the problems of the asymmetrical information between managers and investors. These models 
are based upon the idea that the top executives of the firm that have inner information, have a motive to 
transfer this knowledge to the external investors, so that the stock price will rise. However, managers 
cannot simply announce the good news to the investors, since they will face it with suspicion. 
 
One solution to this problem (for the underestimated firms) is to send to the investors a signal containing 
this information, by adopting a financial policy. This strategy is forbidden from the aspect of cost for a 
firm of less value. The signal is a costly action for the firm, in order to convince the investors and other 
external users that it contains reliable information. To the external users what makes the signal credible is 
its cost. Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2004) argued about costless and costly signals. Managers would not 
announce the good news that they have, because all companies could do this without being valid. Instead 
of this, the administration increases the leverage of the firm. This capital structure is a commitment for the 
firm, which, a firm of mediocre prospects would not dare to undertake. The firms that want to send the 
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signal that they have good prospects, increase their leverage. In contrast, the overestimated firms are not 
willing to undertake the burden of lending because in this way they face the risk of bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, the precision of the signal is significant as well (Veronesi, 2000). 
 
Thus, finally, managers many times use the changes in capital structure, in order to transfer some 
information for the profitability and the risk of the firm, to the external users. Signaling theory is founded 
upon the idea that the internal users know more things than the external users. Moreover, the wages and 
the privileges that managers have, are sometimes dependent on the market value of the company. This 
gives the firm the motive to provide the information to the investors that the firm is underestimated. The 
increased leverage indicates greater possibilities of bankruptcy. It signals positive evolutions, since the 
request for a loan means that the administration believes that the good progress of the firm will allow it 
pay off. 
The information will be credible only if the cost of the false revelation is high enough to force the firm to 
reveal the truth. The leverage increase is an effective signal. The loan contracts force the firm to have 
stable cash flows during the loan period and if the firm does not have it, it will face serious consequences, 
such as bankruptcy. On the contrary, in the case of equities, things are more flexible. Stockholders wait 
typically for, some cash payments, but in this case the administration has the aptitude to reduce or omit 
them during financial recessions. For this reason, taking a new loan is a credible signal for the future cash 
flows to fulfil its obligations. 
The economist who first dealed with the asymmetric information was Akerlof with his Lemons Problem, 
which concerned the car market. Michael Spence continues Akerlof’s idea, in his article (1973), in which 
he introduces the notion of the signaling theory in the labor market. In 2001, Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz 
were nominated with the Nobel Prize for their research on the asymmetrical information during the 70’s. 
This is a sign of the importance of the financial asymmetric information. 
According to a group of theories, for example Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977), the choice of the 
capital structure of the firm is a signal for the external users. According to Noe, the quality of the firms 
that raise loans tends to be better than this of the firms that issue stocks. Thus, Noe’s model predicts a 
negative reaction of the stock price in the announcement of the stocks’ issue.  
Ross believes that capital structure functions as a signaling mechanism in the market. One of the best-
known signals is the undertaking of debt. This action increases the possibilities and the costs of financial 
distress for a firm. The investors know that, and when they notice that a firm increases its debt they 
interpret it as a sign that the managers await in the future such cash flows that will avoid recession. 
Other financial signals are: 
 Dividends 
  Leverage 
 Stock repurchase 
 Announcement of a merger or acquisition 
 Announcement of a tender offer 
 Announcement of a spin off 
 Announcement of poison pill 
The changes in capital structure can alter the conception of the market for the firm’s value. The above 
writers argue that stock issue affects negatively the stock price. To sum up, we see that Ross (1977), Noe 
(1988) and Narayanan (1988) predict a positive reaction of the stock price to the debt increase, while 
Myers and Majluf  predict that the stock price will not be affected by the undertaking of a risk free loan. 
Lucas and McDonald (1990) find that the stock price falls after the announcement of an equity raise, but 
after a small period of time it rises. According to Krasker (1986), the stock price is negatively correlated 
with the issue size. Finally, according to Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) the empirical support to 
signalling theory is statistically significant, but economically insignificant. The companies of high quality 
use more debt, but the differences in leverage are very small. 
2.3 Results of other empirical researches 
The importance of signaling theory has been the object of many researches. Suggestively, the following 
will be mentioned. 
 Johnson’s (1988) research indicates that signaling theory is in force in the USA during 1970-1988. The 
excessive returns of the common stocks were negatively connected with the reductions of the loan’s pay-
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off and the flexibility of the dividends’ distribution. The refunding of the debts can alter the common 
stocks’ prices, if the exchange offer reveals new information about the firm’s prospects. Thirty occasions 
of exchange offers were examined. 
The research of Pugh and Jahera (1990) ends up in accordance with signaling theory in the USA, although 
it examines the theory from the aspect of the stocks’ repurchase, while it adds that the stock prices of the 
firms of greater capitalization are less affected. The excessive returns related with the repurchase 
announcements, are usually considered reaction to the statement of the managers that the firm’s stock is 
underestimated.  This signal from the behalf of the administration provides new information that improves 
the market value of the firm. Two dependent variables were used, the adjusted to risk excessive returns for 
the days before and after the announcement and the premium offered by the administration. One of the 
independent variables is the debt ratio before and after the repurchase. The method used in this research 
was the least squares method, and the periods of time of 40 days and 10 days.  
Signaling theory seems to be valid to the Middle East enterprises as well, according to a research that took 
place in 1994-1996 (Du, Dai, 2005). The sample comprised of enterprises of nine Asian economies, while 
the time period stops before the Asian crisis, which would alter the result. Dependent variables were the 
leverage in historical prices and leverage in market prices. 
Finally, the research of Antoniou, Gunay and Paudyal (2006) in France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom supports signaling theory, examining the debts’ maturity from 1983, 1987 and 1969 for each 
country, to 2000. The debts’ maturity is used as the dependent variable, while among the assumptions 
checked is the validity of signaling theory, which is expressed with the use of four factors, leverage, 
liquidity, variability and the quality of the firm. 
In Egypt, the theory does not seem to be in effect, it is valid only for high risk enterprises (Eldomiaty, 
2004). This research examines the dynamic relations between the changes in the capital structure of the 
enterprises and their effect on the market price, under different levels of systematic risk. The market price, 
or capitalization, of the firm is used as the dependent variable, while the debt ratio is used as the 
independent variable. The enterprises included in the sample are divided in 3 categories with high, 
medium and low beta ratio respectively. The results confirm to some degree the signaling theory, 
especially for the high-risk enterprises. 
 
III. Empirical research of signalling theory for the greek stock market firms   
 
3.1 General information 
  
The alterations caused to the capital structure of a firm from the administration, are expected to have as a 
consequence some variations to the stock price of the firm. Thus, according to signaling theory, the equity 
raise of a firm, should have as an effect a fall of its stock price. This statement is the core of empirical 
research of the Greek stock market. 
We should mention that the Greek Stock Exchange had a great rise at the end of the 90s due to the 
entrance of the Greek economy in the European Monetary Union. But under the pressure of speculatory 
forces, there was a fall in 2000. This financial crisis affected the whole Greek society. We tried to see how 
investors reacted to the announcement of equity raises, a few years after the crisis. Moreover, very few 
researches concern the Greek Stock Exchange, the same period of time the Greek economy was trying to 
become a mature financial market. The case of the Greek Stock Exchange is not a usual one, as at the 
period we examine, the Greek economy was trying to come out of a financial crisis, and at the same time 
become a full member of the European Monetary Union. 
 The research begins with an introductory reference to the notion of the equity raise and how this can be 
achieved, and the procedure followed. Next, we refer to the choice of the sample used, the methodology 
followed and the statistic analysis. The third unit ends with the conclusions of this statistic analysis. 
 
3.2 Equity raise 
 
 The stock markets are known as capital markets, since they are the fundamental way for the enterprises to 
find capitals. The enterprises either issue new stocks, or, if they have already issued stocks, they move to 
equity raise. 
The equity raise can be achieved in two ways, either with capitalization of the retained earnings or with 
extra cash payment. In the first case, the firm moves to financial inscriptions that transfer the retained 
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earnings to the equity. Analogous to the capitalized earnings, new stocks are issued with equal name 
value, as the existing ones and are distributed free of charge to the investors. There might also occur a 
capitalization of the obligations or capitalization of the result coming from the readjustment of the 
financial assets, according to which, the book value of the assets is adjusted with their approximate market 
value. In the second case of the cash payment, the equity raise leads to new capitals for the enterprise. This 
actually means that the firm wants to find new capitals from the investors, either the old ones, or new. But 
if new investors buy the new stocks, the old stockholders will have to face a reduction of their ownership 
percentage. In order for this not to happen, there is a preference right for the old investors – in fact with 
better conditions than the official price of the stocks’ issue.  
The procedure followed for an equity raise consists of: 
1. the Stockholders General Assembly for an equity raise 
2. the approval of the Informative Report by the  Greek Capital Market Committee 
3. the publication of the Informative Report 
4. issue of the Preference Rights 
5. negotiation and use of the Preference Rights 
6. end of negotiation of the Preference Rights 
7. end of use of the Preference Rights 
8. announcement concerning the coverage of the issue and the disposal of the rest of the 
stocks 
9. start of negotiation of the negotiation of the new stocks that come from the equity raise  
The equity raises are sometimes faced with suspicion. Especially after the financial crisis in 2000, many 
enterprises faced serious problems, and the equity raise was the only solution to improve their financial 
situation. Some of them, however, did not manage to cover the equity raise. 
The failure of an equity raise causes nasty comments to the market, having as a result a negative effect 
upon the stock. Therefore, it is a common practice, for the basic investors, who may either have to cover 
the part that is not disposed. This fact also changes in many cases the, after the equity raise, stockholders 
composition. 
It is worth mentioning here that the announcement of  an equity raise has a direct effect on the stock of the 
firm, besides the fact that from the moment the General Assembly decides its materialization until it is 
approved by the stock market, a long period of time intermediates. So, we realize that the investors are 
reluctant to participate to the capital increases of firms, since some of them do not have adequate liquidity. 
Moreover, some of the firms do not have investing interest with long-term prospects, while, at the same 
time, include the risk for devaluation of the titles. 
Systematic abstinence of the investors is noticed mainly in the equity raises of small companies, 
something that points out the reduced trust of the investors to these companies. On the other hand, 




We investigate cases of equity raise that occurred in the Greek Stock Exchange between 2004 and 2006. 
This period of time was chosen, because investors needed some time after the financial crisis of 2000 in 
order to start acting normally again. Under these circumstances, the results may not be correct, because 
investors are still suspicious against any announcement of firms. We have chosen companies that 
proceeded in equity raise, but not as a consequence of a merger or acquisition. The third factor that we 
took into consideration was the availability of the data. 
Finally, the sample consists of 13 cases of equity raise that are shown in the following table (TABLE 1). 
 
TABLE- 1:Sample of the research 
 
Company 
Issue of new stocks 
with preference right 
Ratio of issue of 
new to old 




of the Informative 
Report 
 LANNET  14.761.076 4:10 15.351.519,04  8-11-2005 
 ETE 135.707.764 4:10 3.000.498.662,04   100,00    9-6-2006 
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 LAZARIDIS  1.436.800 1:10 3.448.320,00   100,00    20-2-2004 
 MARFIN  25.000.000  400.000.000   190,00    19-12-2005 
 ATE 624.444.444 20:09 1.248.888.888,00   100,00    27-5-2005 
 EMPORIKI  26.478.294 5:20 397.174.410   100,00    10-11-2005 
 GENIKI  14.857.143 - 89.142.858,00   100,00    27-2-2004 
LESVOS - - - - 16-11-2005 
 DIAS  25.110.000 1:01   26-5-2006 
 PLIAS  63.908.001 1,9:1 18.238.997  19-6-2006 
 ALPHA BANK  97.271,00  437.709,77  24-11-2004 
 FORTHNET  21.411.490 5:04 119.904.344   100,00    25-4-2006 
 KERANIS  11.459.490 1:03 6.548.282,50   100,00    21-10-2004 
 
 We should note that the firm PLIAS was by that time under surveillance, something that may have 
affected its price and the investors’ reactions to its announcements. 
 The sample is quite small, due to the fact that the firms at that period tended to raise their equity only 
when they proceeded to a merger or acquisition. But the announcement of a merger or acquisition is a 
positive signal for the investors, so the results if we included these cases of equity raises, would be 




The data used in this paper is extracted from many sources. The data related to the stock prices are from 
the site of the Greek Stock Exchange. The details for each equity raise were extracted from the annual 
reports of the firms, the press, and the Internet. The data covers three years 2004-2006. The statistical 
analysis was done, with the use of the stock prices of the firms two months before and two months after 
the announcement of the equity raise. As announcement day, we consider the day when the Informative 
Report was published. We assume that, in order for signaling theory to be valid, the equity raise should 
have a negative effect on the stock price, in comparison with the time before the announcement. 
 
3.5 Statistical analysis 
 
The software that was used is SPSS. In the first case, we examine the returns of the stock 30 days before 
and 30 days after the publication of the Informative Report. We examine the logarithmic returns in two 
periods. The first period of time ends the day before the announcement,  while the second one, contains all 
the rest. The names of the stocks of the first period have the abbreviation “_b(efore)” , while the ones of 





We test whether the average returns of the two periods equal to zero. This actually means that we test 
whether the returns belong to a distribution, which has average equal to zero, something that we 
theoretically expect to happen. 
Test hypotheses: 
H0: the average equals to zero (μ=0) 
H1: the average is not equal to zero 






Test Value = 0 
T df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Lannet_b ,342 29 ,735 ,0023167 -,011538 ,016171 
ETE_b -1,497 29 ,145 -,0090667 -,021457 ,003324 
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Laz_b -1,688 29 ,102 -,0056233 -,012439 ,001192 
Marfin_b ,683 29 ,500 ,0021200 -,004232 ,008472 
ATE_b -1,090 29 ,285 -,0074300 -,021368 ,006508 
Emporiki_b ,871 29 ,391 ,0023700 -,003193 ,007933 
Geniki_b 1,129 29 ,268 ,0054933 -,004462 ,015449 
Lesvos_b -,427 29 ,673 -,0021533 -,012476 ,008169 
Dias_b -,799 29 ,431 -,0035400 -,012599 ,005519 
Plias_b -,352 29 ,728 -,0041767 -,028460 ,020107 
Alpha_b ,306 29 ,762 ,0010733 -,006112 ,008259 
Forth_b 1,653 29 ,109 ,0114200 -,002714 ,025554 
Keranis_b -,323 29 ,749 -,0014167 -,010388 ,007554 
Lannet_a ,715 38 ,479 ,00524 -,0096 ,0201 
ETE_a ,493 38 ,625 ,00242 -,0075 ,0123 
Laz_a ,781 38 ,440 ,00259 -,0041 ,0093 
Marfin_a 1,390 38 ,173 ,00639 -,0029 ,0157 
ATE_a -,703 38 ,487 -,00839 -,0326 ,0158 
Emporiki_a 2,077 38 ,045 ,00543 ,0001 ,0107 
Geniki_a ,796 38 ,431 ,00252 -,0039 ,0089 
Lesvos_a 1,506 38 ,140 ,01983 -,0068 ,0465 
Dias_a -,591 38 ,558 -,00178 -,0079 ,0043 
Plias_a ,630 38 ,532 ,00468 -,0103 ,0197 
Alpha_a 1,711 38 ,095 ,00321 -,0006 ,0070 
Forth_a -,766 38 ,448 -,00568 -,0207 ,0093 
Keranis_a ,286 38 ,776 ,00179 -,0109 ,0145 
 
With the use of One-Sample Test, we accept the H0 for all the companies, because the possibility that 
appears in column Sig is greater than 0.05. Moreover, the level of significance is 95% (columns 
lower/upper). Within it, there is price zero (the smallest price is negative, while the biggest price is 
positive). As an exception, we should mention Emporiki after the announcement of the equity raise, for 





We test whether the prices follow the Normal Distribution. 
Test hypotheses: 
H0: the returns follow the Normal Distribution 
H1: the returns do not follow the Normal Distribution 
In this case, we use One Sample Kolmogorof Test, which is used in quantitative variables and examines 
whether the cumulative frequency of a variable in the sample looks like the the one that would 
theoretically appear if it followed the Normal Distribution. In order to accept the H0 hypothesis, the 
possibility in line Asymp.Sig. should be greater than the level of significance that is chosen (Table 3 & 
Table 4). 






























































































































































































e ,158 ,122 ,119 ,175 ,162 ,103 ,124 ,185 ,146 ,207 ,063 ,143 ,160 
  Positive ,158 ,122 ,080 ,175 ,139 ,103 ,124 ,185 ,146 ,207 ,062 ,143 ,160 
  Negativ
e 
-,097 -,049 -,119 -,112 -,162 -,060 -,063 -,087 -,138 -,178 -,063 -,092 -,126 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Z 
,988 ,760 ,746 
1,09
0 
1,011 ,641 ,774 1,156 ,913 1,292 ,391 ,896 ,997 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,283 ,611 ,634 ,185 ,258 ,806 ,586 ,138 ,375 ,071 ,998 ,398 ,273 
 
For the two periods of time, we accept the basic hypothesis, that the variables follow the Normal 


































































































































,764 ,292 ,850 ,216 ,765 ,379 ,072 ,209 ,449 ,995 ,008 ,058 
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We examined whether there is a difference between the averages of the two periods for each company. 
This test is used in dependent samples in two different periods of time. The test hypotheses that we made 
are the following: 
H0: the averages are equal (μ1-μ2=0) 
Η1:the averages are different 
The results are shown in the Table below (Table 5) 
 
TABLE- 5: Paired Samples Test 





Interval of the 
Difference       
  Lower Upper       
Pair 1 Lannet_b - 
Lannet_a 
-,0144922 ,0185655 ,252 29 ,803 
Pair 2 ETE_b - ETE_a -,0296508 ,0100508 -1,010 29 ,321 
Pair 3 Laz_b - Laz_a -,0150050 ,0040250 -1,180 29 ,248 
Pair 4 Marfin_b - 
Marfin_a 
-,0169565 ,0075299 -,787 29 ,437 
Pair 5 ATE_b - ATE_a -,0216434 ,0432901 ,682 29 ,501 
Pair 6 Emporiki_b - 
Emporiki_a 
-,0076267 ,0049267 -,440 29 ,663 
Pair 7 Geniki_b - 
Geniki_a 
-,0084905 ,0118772 ,340 29 ,736 
Pair 8 Lesvos_b - 
Lesvos_a 
-,0614780 ,0026113 -1,879 29 ,070 
Pair 9 Dias_b - Dias_a -,0099922 ,0075522 -,284 29 ,778 
Pair 10 Plias_b - Plias_a -,0387386 ,0201052 -,648 29 ,522 
Pair 11 Alpha_b - 
Alpha_a 
-,0127356 ,0055823 -,799 29 ,431 
Pair 12 Forth_b - Forth_a -,0024441 ,0411907 1,816 29 ,080 
Pair 13 Keranis_b - 
Keranis_a 
-,0186437 ,0197970 ,061 29 ,951 
 
We used the Paired Samples Test, where u=0. In the columns Lower/upper, zero is included, so, with the 
fault possibility of 0,05, there is no difference in the average returns before and after the announcement. 
We also see that, in a significance level of 10%, the stock of LESVOS has a negative t=-1,879, which 
means that the average returns of the stock were lower than the ones after the equity raise. This result is in 
contrary with the signaling theory that predicts a fall in the stock price after the announcement. On the 
other hand, the stock of FORTHNET has a positive statistic t=1,816, so its average returns are lower after 





The last test is about the variances before and after the equity raise. 
H0: the variances before and after the announcement are equal 
H1: the variances are different 
We can see the results of this test in Table 6. 
TABLE- 6: Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Lannet ,185 1 67 ,668 
ETE ,062 1 67 ,804 
Laz 1,601 1 67 ,210 
Marfin 1,153 1 67 ,287 
ATE 4,883 1 67 ,031 
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Emporiki ,887 1 67 ,350 
Geniki 1,481 1 67 ,228 
Lesvos 22,466 1 67 ,000 
Dias ,095 1 67 ,758 
Plias 4,226 1 67 ,044 
Alpha 7,291 1 67 ,009 
Forth 1,739 1 67 ,192 
Keranis 3,475 1 67 ,067 
Using the Test of Homogeneity of Variances, we found that the variances remained the same. In order to 
accept the basic hypothesis, the possibility in column Sig should be greater than the significance level. 
Exceptions are the prices of the companies ATE, LESVOS, PLIAS, ALPHA and KERANIS. In all these 
cases, the variance of the second period is greater. 
Finally, using the Paired Samples Correlations, we find that in all the companies (except for DIAS and 
GENIKI that have a significant positive correlation) do not have a strong linear correlation between the 
prices of the two periods (Table 7). 
TABLE- 7: Paired Samples Correlations 
 N Correlation Sig. 
Pair 1 Lannet_b & 
Lannet_a 
30 ,298 ,110 
Pair 2 ETE_b & ETE_a 30 -,239 ,204 
Pair 3 Laz_b & Laz_a 30 ,157 ,408 
Pair 4 Marfin_b & 
Marfin_a 
30 ,123 ,519 
Pair 5 ATE_b & ATE_a 30 ,033 ,862 
Pair 6 Emporiki_b & 
Emporiki_a 
30 ,347 ,060 
Pair 7 Geniki_b & 
Geniki_a 
30 ,374 ,042 
Pair 8 Lesvos_b & 
Lesvos_a 
30 ,133 ,483 
Pair 9 Dias_b & Dias_a 30 ,441 ,015 
Pair 10 Plias_b & Plias_a 30 -,059 ,756 
Pair 11 Alpha_b & 
Alpha_a 
30 -,216 ,251 
Pair 12 Forth_b & 
Forth_a 
30 ,101 ,597 
Pair 13 Keranis_b & 
Keranis_a 
30 -,121 ,526 
 
Second round of tests for a period of time 14 days before and 14 days after the announcement 
 
In this second round of tests, we used the same tests, altering the periods of time. We created a period 
comprising of the 15 days before the announcement and 14 days after the announcement. The names of 
the variables are followed by _p (before the announcement) and _k (after the announcement). 





TABLE- 8: One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 0 




Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Lannet_k ,565 38 ,575 ,0040615 -,010491 ,018614 
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ETE_k -,207 38 ,837 -,0007590 -,008172 ,006655 
Laz_k ,996 38 ,326 ,0032000 -,003305 ,009705 
Marfin_k 1,652 38 ,107 ,0039795 -,000897 ,008856 
ATE_k -,115 38 ,909 -,0007359 -,013661 ,012189 
Emporiki_k 1,689 38 ,099 ,0046128 -,000916 ,010141 
Geniki_k 1,305 38 ,200 ,0056154 -,003097 ,014328 
Lesvos_k 1,252 38 ,218 ,0158000 -,009752 ,041352 
Dias_k -,327 38 ,746 -,0008769 -,006313 ,004559 
Plias_k ,433 38 ,668 ,0037615 -,013835 ,021358 
Alpha_k ,830 38 ,411 ,0015744 -,002263 ,005412 
Forth_k -1,724 38 ,093 -,0084205 -,018308 ,001467 
Keranis_k ,149 38 ,882 ,0007026 -,008839 ,010245 
Lannet_p ,546 29 ,589 ,0038533 -,010575 ,018282 
ETE_p -,655 29 ,518 -,0049400 -,020375 ,010495 
Laz_p -1,867 29 ,072 -,0064133 -,013440 ,000613 
Marfin_p ,875 29 ,389 ,0052567 -,007032 ,017545 
ATE_p -1,187 29 ,245 -,0173800 -,047333 ,012573 
Emporiki_p 1,347 29 ,188 ,0034300 -,001777 ,008637 
Geniki_p ,488 29 ,629 ,0014733 -,004700 ,007646 
Lesvos_p ,414 29 ,682 ,0030800 -,012148 ,018308 
Dias_p -,992 29 ,329 -,0047200 -,014450 ,005010 
Plias_p -,289 29 ,774 -,0029867 -,024108 ,018135 
Alpha_p ,914 29 ,368 ,0032000 -,003960 ,010360 
Forth_p 1,532 29 ,136 ,0149867 -,005015 ,034988 
Keranis_p ,000 29 1,000 ,0000000 -,014216 ,014216 
The 1
st
 test (Table 8) shows again that the average price equals to zero. But, in the significance level of 
10%, the average price of EMPORIKI and FORTHNET before the announcement, and LAZARIDIS after 









































































































,171 ,108 ,153 ,106 ,120 ,113 ,155 ,144 ,142 ,169 ,094 ,188 ,253 






-,103 -,106 -,120 -,086 -,088 -,092 -,128 -,154 -,094 -,188 -,165 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Z 
1,068 ,676 ,956 ,664 ,752 ,708 ,966 ,896 ,889 1,053 ,588 1,173 1,581 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,204 ,750 ,320 ,769 ,624 ,698 ,309 ,398 ,408 ,217 ,880 ,128 ,014 
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,140 ,085 ,113 ,151 ,199 ,118 ,123 ,330 ,228 ,146 ,099 ,210 ,173 
,140 ,085 ,072 ,151 ,167 ,099 ,123 ,330 ,228 ,146 ,099 ,210 ,173 
-,091 -,048 -,113 -,122 -,199 -,118 -,080 -,170 -,190 -,105 -,075 -,167 -,136 




,602 ,981 ,834 ,499 ,188 ,800 ,757 ,003 ,088 ,548 ,930 ,141 ,328 
a  Test distribution is Normal. 
b  Calculated from data 
In the 2
nd
 test (Table 9), most of the companies keep following the Normal Distribution. Exceptions in this 





TABLE- 10: Paired Samples Test 





Interval of the 
Difference       
  Lower Upper       
Pair 1 Lannet_k - 
Lannet_p 
-,0274151 ,0171951 -,469 29 ,643 
Pair 2 ETE_k - 
ETE_p 
-,0153516 ,0184450 ,187 29 ,853 
Pair 3 Laz_k - Laz_p -,0012083 ,0153483 1,747 29 ,091 
Pair 4 Marfin_k - 
Marfin_p 
-,0160576 ,0129376 -,220 29 ,827 
Pair 5 ATE_k - 
ATE_p 
-,0243758 ,0425291 ,555 29 ,583 
Pair 6 Emporiki_k - 
Emporiki_p 
-,0099037 ,0083637 -,172 29 ,864 
Pair 7 Geniki_k - 
Geniki_p 
-,0079702 ,0206635 ,907 29 ,372 
Pair 8 Lesvos_k - 
Lesvos_p 
-,0151426 ,0530760 1,137 29 ,265 
Pair 9 Dias_k - 
Dias_p 
-,0086839 ,0158439 ,597 29 ,555 
Pair 10 Plias_k - 
Plias_p 
-,0234777 ,0373510 ,466 29 ,644 
Pair 11 Alpha_k - 
Alpha_p 
-,0096286 ,0082752 -,155 29 ,878 
Pair 12 Forth_k - 
Forth_p 
-,0491950 -,0038183 -2,389 29 ,024 
Pair 13 Keranis_k - 
Keranis_p 




 test (Table 10), all companies have the same average returns before and after the announcement, 
apart from LAZARIDIS and FORTHNET. FORTHNET has a statistic t=-2,389, so we conclude that the 
average returns after the announcement is higher, opposing to the signaling theory. This result is also in 
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contrast with the first round of tests, when the same company confirmed signaling theory. LAZARIDIS 





TABLE- 11: Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Lannet 1,346 1 67 ,250 
ETE 7,085 1 67 ,010 
Laz ,228 1 67 ,635 
Marfin 8,144 1 67 ,006 
ATE 3,052 1 67 ,085 
Emporiki 1,948 1 67 ,167 
Geniki ,782 1 67 ,380 
Lesvos 5,772 1 67 ,019 
Dias ,122 1 67 ,728 
Plias ,030 1 67 ,863 
Alpha 1,598 1 67 ,211 
Forth 10,987 1 67 ,001 




 test, we see that ETE, MARFIN, ATE, LESVOS and FORTHNET have a diversification in 
variances before and after the announcement. Furthermore, all the companies, in this 28-day period, have 
higher variances than in the first case. Finally, in the test about the correlation coefficients, only MARFIN 
and EMPORIKI have a significant negative correlation of their returns before and after the announcement. 
Finally, about the correlation coefficients, we found in Table 12: 
TABLE- 12: Paired Samples Correlations 
 N Correlation Sig. 
Pair 1 Lannet_k & 
Lannet_p 
30 -,284 ,128 
Pair 2 ETE_k & ETE_p 30 ,137 ,470 
Pair 3 Laz_k & Laz_p 30 ,353 ,056 
Pair 4 Marfin_k & 
Marfin_p 
30 -,397 ,030 
Pair 5 ATE_k & ATE_p 30 -,043 ,823 
Pair 6 Emporiki_k & 
Emporiki_p 
30 -,382 ,037 
Pair 7 Geniki_k & 
Geniki_p 
30 -,323 ,082 
Pair 8 Lesvos_k & 
Lesvos_p 
30 -,014 ,942 
Pair 9 Dias_k & Dias_p 30 -,131 ,491 
Pair 10 Plias_k & Plias_p 30 -,122 ,520 
Pair 11 Alpha_k & 
Alpha_p 
30 -,138 ,468 
Pair 12 Forth_k & 
Forth_p 
30 -,027 ,889 
Pair 13 Keranis_k & 
Keranis_p 
30 -,088 ,642 
 
We see that only in the cases of MARFIN and EMPORIKI, their returns have a strong negative correlation 




The results of the empirical analysis do not confirm signalling theory in the Greek Stock Exchange. 
Among the 13 cases of equity raise of the sample, only FORTHNET and LAZARIDIS had a fall in the 
stock returns after the publication of the Informative Report, while in 5 cases we had a raise in their 
variance after the publication. In the first round of tests, we examined the stock prices 30 days before and 
30 days after the announcement of the equity raise, while in the second round of tests we used a period of 
time of 14 days before and 14 days after the announcement. 
The fact that signalling theory does not seem to be valid in this sample could be due to a number of 
factors: 
The Greek Stock Exchange, during the period of time we examined, was coming out of a crisis, so the 
results may not be representative. Moreover, the Greek Stock Market is in effort to become one of the 
mature markets. The result could also be affected by the fact that some of the companies may have a small 
number of investors holding their stocks. 
The data was for a small number of companies and for a small period of time. In the sample was also a 
company under surveillance. 
Furthermore, many of the companies were banks and, in general, companies of great capitalization, so the 
investors have significant trust in them. The announcement of the equity raise was not viewed as a bad 
signal, as signaling theory predicted, because the investor did not worry about the quality of the companies 
and the reasons they proceeded in the equity raise. 
 
V. Final thoughts and suggestions for further discussion 
 
Capital structure is one of the most argued subjects in finance. A great number of theories have tried to 
explain the difference between the debt ratios of companies. These theories suggest that companies 
determine their capital structure, depending on the costs and advantages that relate to each type of finance. 
This paper examines signaling theory and whether it is valid in the Greek Stock Exchange. According to 
signaling theory, investors view the equity raise as a signal of risk, so we would expect a price fall after 
the announcement of the equity raise. But this does not seem to happen, according to the investigation. 
From the 13 firms of the sample, only two had a fall of their stock price. 
The same investigation could be done using a larger and more representative sample, or using another 
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